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Duty of Landlord to Put Tenant
Into Possession
Loraine P. O'Keefe*
A S PIONEERING JUDGES base their decisions more and more on
fairness and practicality, timeliness becomes an important
test for any rule of law. This test becomes particularly pertinent
when there exist, side by side, in connection with a single point
of law, two irreconcilable views, both of which can boast of proud
precedents and a heavy "weight of authority." 1 Such are the
two views in regard to the very old landlord-tenant problem
with which we are here concerned: in the absence of an express
provision, is there implied, in the lessor-lessee relationship itself,
an obligation on the part of the landlord to put the tenant into
actual possession of the demised premises? The practical effect
of such an obligation would require the landlord "to oust tres-
passers and wrongdoers so as to have it [the premises] open for
entry by the tenant at the beginning of the term." 2 Whether the
landlord should be thus charged is indeed an old problem, and
yet is brand new, a potential source of contention each time that
a lease is signed or an oral agreement to let is entered into. Thus
the logic, or lack of it, in the reasoning supporting either of the
two views on this issue must be considered in the light of what
is practical today.
One view, known as the English rule, in spite of the fact that
"courts in a considerable number of states" 3 also adhere to it,
holds that "there is an implied covenant in a lease, on the part
of the landlord, that the premises shall be open to entry by the
tenant at the time fixed by the lease for the beginning of the
term." 4 The American rule is the exact antithesis: there is no
such implication; rather, the ousting of trespassers and wrong-
doers is the responsibility of the lessee, and he has no remedy
against the lessor for any third party unlawfully holding the
*Student at Univ. of Calif., Hastings College of the Law.
1 Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S. E. 824 (1930): "It is generally
claimed that the weight of authority favors the particular view contended
for. There are, however, no scales upon which we can weigh the author-
ities. In numbers and respectability they may be quite equally balanced."
2 Ibid.
3 West v. Kitchell, 109 Miss. 328, 68 So. 469 (1915).
4 Ibid.
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premises at the commencement of his lease term; his remedy is
against the wrongdoer.
The terms "unlawfully" and "wrongdoers" point to what the
problem is not. It is not, as some have thought,5 a question of
an implied covenant for quiet enjoyment, which refers only to
lawful obstacles placed in the lessee's path through some fault
of the lessor. This covenant guarantees that no one with para-
mount title or sanction from the landlord will disturb the lessee:
"The covenant for quiet enjoyment, whether express or im-
plied, only means that the lessor shall have such title to the
premises as will enable him to give a good unencumbered lease
for the term demised. . . . Such a covenant is understood to
confer upon the lessee a right to enter upon the premises, but
nothing more." 1
Therefore, the lessee has the legal right to enter on the day
set by the lease, and there would be no question to discuss here
except that the lessee sometimes is not able to enter because a
third party is occupying the premises. Usually he is a holdover
tenant who refuses to vacate when his lease expires. At this
point adherents of the English rule would imply a right of the
lessee to take legal action against the lessor, but those who hold
to the American rule discover an anomaly in this position which
disturbs their sense of logic. Vaughan (1665-1674), rejecting
what he referred to as "strained" and "improbable," was actually
defining the "American rule" when he said: ". . . it is un-
reasonable a man should covenant against the tortious acts of
strangers, impossible for him to prevent . . . the covenantor,
who is innocent, shall be charged, when the lessee hath his
natural remedy against the wrong doer: and the covenantor
made to defend a man from that which the law defends every
man, that is, from wrong." 7
5 A typical illustration: The lease "implies that the purchaser shall have
possession; and without it, it would seem the covenant for quiet enjoyment
is broken." King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229 (1880).
6 Gazzola v. Chambers, 73 IIl. 75 (1874).
7 Hayes v. Bickerstaff, Vaugh. 118, 124 Eng. Rep. 997 (1670), echoed two
and a half centuries later by Snider v. Deban, 249 Mass. 59, 144 N. E. 69(1924).
An interesting speculation is why the English courts abandoned this
approach. Up to 1790, Vaughan's arguments were the law. What happened
between 1790 and 1829 to cause the English jurists to do an apparently
sudden (and unexplainable?) about face in Coe v. Clay, 5 Bing. 440, 130
Eng. Rep. 1131 (1829), and cases following?
Referring to the holding in Hayes v. Bickerstaff, then abruptly rejecting
(Continued on next page)
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It is this "legal exception" which affronted the court's sense
of justice in Hannan v. Dusch: s
It does not occur to us now that there is any other instance
in which one clearly without fault is held responsible for
the independent tort of another in which he has neither par-
ticipated nor concurred and whose misdoings he cannot
control....
To apply the English rule you must imply a covenant on
the part of the landlord to protect the tenant from the tort
of another, though he has entered into no such covenant.
This seems to be a unique exception, an exception which
stands alone in implying a contract of insurance on the
part of the lessor to save his tenant from all the consequences
of the flagrant wrong of another person. Such an obli-
gation is so unusual and the prevention of such a tort so im-
possible as to make it certain, we think, that it should
always rest upon an express contract.
Defenders of the English rule are willing to make this
''unique exception" and place this "unusual obligation" on the
landlord apparently (in part) for two historical reasons which
no longer seem applicable:
1. The tenant at one time needed extra protection from the
law; he had neither the education nor the material means to deal
on an equal basis with the landlord. Might it not have been
such consideration which led the learned judge in Herpolsheimer
v. Christopher9 to argue:
Can it be supposed that the plaintiff in this case would have
entered into the lease if he had known at the time that he
could not obtain possession on the first of March, but that he
would be compelled to begin a lawsuit, await the law's de-
lays, and follow the case through its devious turnings to an
end before he could hope to obtain possession of the land
he had leased? Most assuredly not. It is unreasonable to
suppose that a man would knowingly contract for a lawsuit
or take the chance of one.
This appears to be a one-sided appeal on behalf of the tenant.
A modern court, looking for equal justice for landlord and
tenant, might well ask just what led the Nebraska court to think
(Continued from preceding page)
it, Coe v. Clay became the basis for the English rule. King v. Reynolds
(1880) supra n. 5, the leading American case affirming the English rule,
relies heavily on Coe v. Clay.
8 Supra n. 1.
9 76 Neb. 352, 107 N. W. 382 (1906).
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the landlord would know any more about the tortious plans of
the former tenant than the new lessee did. Of course, "the ten-
ant will suffer delay in obtaining possession if he is forced to sue
for it, but so would the landlord under the same circumstances."
Are we willing, then, in the light of present-day conditions, to
continue making the "unique exception"? Mr. Freeman, in his
notes to Sloan v. Hart,10 urges upon us the rule which would
be "in accordance with the general course of business dealings
in respect to insurance against the chances of a lawsuit" :
It is not, we believe, customary for a person who contracts
in respect to any subject to insure the other party against
lawsuits. Indeed, both the landlord and tenant have a right
to presume that a former tenant will vacate at the end of
his term, and that no one will unlawfully prevent the new
tenant from going into possession. To sue or be sued is a
privilege or misfortune which may occur to anyone.
Needless to say, the "misfortune" of having to take legal action
can be easily averted by including in the lease an express
guaranty of possession, a safeguard which most tenants today
(literate, even affluent, possibly with attorneys of their own)
can easily provide for.
2. The land must be actually delivered to the tenant: "When
realty is the subject, still there must be livery of seisin." 11
Since possession is not transferred until the lessee enters and
begins occupancy, the right remains in the landlord to eject any
holdover. Under the American rule, however, the right to pos-
session passes when the lease is executed:
Indeed, as to the remedy by ejectment, the suit must be
brought by the lessee, the right of entry being in him alone
at the time.
When the defendant leased the land to the plaintiff, the
contract of leasing transferred to the plaintiff all the pos-
session the defendant had; and if a trespasser afterwards
went into possession, his acts were a trespass against the
lessee and not against the landlord. 12
10 150 N. C. 269, 63 S. E. 723 (1909).
11 King v. Reynolds, supra n. 5.
12 Gardner v. Keteltas, 3 Hill. (N. Y.) 330 (1842), generally considered the
origin of the American or New York rule.
In accord: McGhee v. Cox, 116 Va. 718, 82 S. E. 701 (1914): "The gen-
eral rule is that a lease becomes complete and takes effect upon its execu-
tion, unless otherwise specifically provided, and entry by the lessee is not
necessary to give it effect."
May, 1966
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol15/iss2/21
TO PUT TENANT INTO POSSESSION
Weighing these two viewpoints on the passing of possession
against a background of air mailed communications, trans-
oceanic telephone calls, and other current commercial practices,
the requirement of livery of seisin appears incongruous and, in-
deed, actually impracticable. If a businessman now in Paris were
to arrange through his attorney for a long-term lease on a store
in San Francisco, would he have to begin occupancy before we
would admit the right to possession had passed to him? Sup-
pose he were a month late moving in. Since the English rule
applies only to the first day of the lease, does this mean his late
arrival would absolve the landlord of his responsibility to have
the premises open for him? 13 To avoid such difficulties, juris-
dictions which follow the American rule now have statutes
which provide that the signing of a lease is as effective as livery
of seisin and statutes conferring on the lessee the right to take
action against any wrongful tenant.
Comparison, then, of the bases for the two rules reveals
some outmoded concepts behind the English rule which cause
it to fail the test of timeliness. The American rule, on the other
hand, recognizes a change in the landlord-tenant relation which
puts the tenant on equal footing with his landlord. No longer
need courts allow that illogical exception which holds a man
responsible for the tort of another whose misdoings he cannot
control. The law helps those who help themselves, it has been
said, and tenants nowadays are for the most part capable of
helping themselves.
13 "But what," asks the court in Hannan v. Dusch, supra n. 1, "is the sub-
stantial difference between invading the lessee's right of possession on the
first or a later day?"
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